
Interethnic Aggression and Extremism in the Rostov Region: Forming Factors in the Conditions of Social Realities of a Multiethnic Region

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Abstract:

The article is devoted to studying the specifics of the forming factors of interethnic aggression and extremism in a multiethnic region. Based on the results of their own research and the analysis of secondary sociological data, the authors emphasize four primary groups of factors causing the manifestations of interethnic aggression and extremist practices in the Rostov Region: social and economic, sociocultural, geopolitical and the factors connected with the conflictogenic potential of labor migration.

It is emphasized that the escalating interethnic tension and aggression in the region have not gained critical character yet; however, under the influence of the pointed factors, the conflictogenic environment is formed, which at occurrence of crisis situations or appearance of radical opinion leaders can provoke an increase in the number of crimes of extremist character.

At the end, it is concluded that the urgent need in the minimization of these trends requires carrying out a system policy of the interethnic relations regulation, improving the migrants' adaptation system and developing a multicultural education system in the region.

Keywords: *extremism, interethnic aggression, ethnic tension, migration, multicultural region.*

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1. Introduction

During the periods of transformations, periodically arising in development of any society, with which essential deformations of people's living conditions and way of life, vacuum of values, ambiguity of vital prospects and inevitable aggravation of contradictions are connected, extremism becomes one of the most difficult to root out and the most dangerous characteristics of social being. Acting as an extreme form of intolerance, extremism is connected to aggression and violence as intransigence expression methods.

The supporters of extreme views seek to avoid assessing the complexity of economic, political, social, cultural, environmental, and other problems of society, try to find for themselves simplified, prompt solutions consisting in appealing to primitive instincts of crowd, feelings, beliefs and prejudices. In their destructive activity, extremists speculate on those questions which stand most sharply in mass consciousness of the population of a region or a country. In the states with multinational culture, including Russia, the appeal to ethnicity becomes one of the main ideas of manipulation from radical groups. In the situation of economic crisis, migration growth, existence of contradictory poorly controlled information stream and lack of clear national policy, the active use of the ethnic resource for stirring interethnic aggression and dissention becomes one of the main threats to the national security of the country.

This problem gains special sharpness in multiethnic regions. These include the Rostov Region, too. For historical reasons, the region as an administrative-territorial unit, as the subject of the Russian Federation, despite the numerical prevalence of the Russians – according to the last Russian population census, their share was 87% (Territorial Body of the Federal State Statistics Service for the Rostov Region, n.d.), has specifics of a multicultural region: the ethnic composition of the subject includes more than 150 ethnic groups. The results of regional social surveys show that in general by estimates of the inhabitants of the region, the tension in the sphere of interethnic interactions has slightly decreased in recent years (Volkov *et al.*, 2016). At the same time, the relations between ethnic groups are still far from being absolutely tolerant: according to the polls, it can be said that there is some distancing of ethnic groups in the course of daily communication. Moreover, on average, about two thirds of the population of the region (Barkov *et al.*, 2015) feel animosity with different degree of frequency to individuals of another ethnicity. All this indicates the existence of latent tension in the sphere of ethnic interaction, which in case of occurrence of crisis situations or appearance of radical opinion leaders can provoke crimes of extremist character.

The experts' opinions of this problem are also unfavorable. The results of a series of the expert interviews conducted by specialists of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University show that the problems in the field of interethnic relations in the region exist and are urgent today: *"In general, the*

interethnic relations are stable, but there is an increase in tension and polarization in moods and public opinion, and with differentiation by districts". Moreover, among the reasons for which the latent protest potential of the population of the region can be mainstreamed, as the results of interviewing show, ethnic tension takes the leading position: *"Mass protest actions can be only on interethnic relations grounds. The household conflicts – fights, showdown, and intolerant behavior - can become a reason for similar disorders"; "The basic problem which captured both Rostov-on-Don and the Rostov Region is interethnic conflicts. This problem will not be resolved in the nearest future and will drag on for many years. In many respects, it acts as the only one capable to bring the youth to the streets"* (Serikov, 2013a). The protest actions which took place in Rostov-on-Don after the murder of a student of one of Rostov higher education institutions by another student of the North Caucasus descent are the striking example of youth's spontaneous protest activity, manifestation of latent social tension waiting for a convenient reason and events for its transformation into a protest.

The multifactorial nature of interethnic aggression formation and extremization of the population in multiethnic communities makes impossible the development of universal measures of counteraction. In the current situation, it is important to analyze the specifics of the entire range of determinants of these phenomena in the conditions of social reality of the concrete region so that the technologies of prevention and counteraction are as effective as possible. Thus, the purpose of this article is the analysis of the forming factors of interethnic aggression and extremism in the Rostov Region.

2. Review of literature

The phenomenon of extremism has a complex nature and a variety of manifestations; therefore, this range of problems lies at the intersection of various branches of science, and the works of researchers have a cross-disciplinary character. Extremism as a sociocultural phenomenon, its connections with other social processes, and the historical and cultural prerequisites of extremist consciousness formation were considered in the works of several authors (Dahrendorf, 1994; Huntington, 2011; Robinson and Keltner, 1996; Ferguson, 2016).

Great attention in the works of researchers was received by the problematics of extremism among young people as the most susceptible to radical views and forms of behavior (Cragin *et al.*, 2015; Awan, 2016; Khagurov, 2016; Chuprov and Zubok, 2009). Youth subcultures, the features of their ideology and a social portrait of the participants also became a subject of research interest (Brown, 2004; Young and Craig, 1997; Selin and Shchurov, 2013). The plots connected with ethno-national conditionality of youth extremism are developed by Mudde (2005), Omelicheva (2010) and Serikov (2012).

Due to the escalation of the situation in the Middle East, scientists show more interest in the problems of religious extremism, its communication with ideologies of certain political groups, the gender and social and demographical composition of participants in religious extremist communities (Edwards, 2015; Simons, 2016; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Mares, 2015; Ogonnaya, 2013; Stroeva *et al.*, 2015).

In the conditions of the globalization and informatization of society, which are followed by the minimization of the growing information streams' control, the role of the information factor in distribution of the extremist ideas considerably amplified. In this regard, more and more studies are dedicated to the forms and technologies of extremism promotion in the information space, the features of the audience of the extremist communities' websites, the forms of counteraction to manipulative information technologies (Costello *et al.*, 2016a; Costello *et al.*, 2016b; Khader *et al.*, 2016; Aly *et al.*, 2016; Conway, 2017; Zavalnev, 2016).

As for the South of Russia, the cosmopolitan and multi-religious region with a boundary administrative-territorial arrangement of the federal districts which are its part, it draws attention of scientists working in the subject field of the problematics of escalation and distribution of extremism and interethnic aggression. In the South of Russia, several scientific schools were formed, which are engaged in the development of the questions arisen above among them from Southern Federal University Dobaev *et al.* (2012), Shevchenko (2015), Denisova (2014), Salimova and Makolov, (2016), Bashmakov *et al.*, 2015) and the affiliated branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Rostov-on-Don Ponedelkov and Mikhailov (2014), Vorontsov (2012), Kossova *et al.* (2014). However, it should be noted that the main research interest at the same time is concentrated on the regions which are a part of the North Caucasian Federal District and the Stavropol Territory. The specifics of the factors of the population extremization and interethnic aggression in the Rostov Region have not yet become a subject matter of research.

3. Methods

This research is conducted based on such general scientific methods as the system and factorial analysis. The empirical base of the research is the statistical data submitted by the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation and the Territorial Administration of the Federal State Statistics Service in the Rostov Region. In the work, the analysis of sociological data, both secondary and received during own studies, is also carried out. The secondary analysis of the following mass polls was made:

- 1) The research of the South Russian branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Poverty and Social Inequality in the Rostov Region" (2013). The representative sample size was 851 people.

2) The research of the South Russian branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Middle Class in the Rostov Region: Behavioral Strategies, Value Systems and Social Platforms of Formation" (2014). The representative sample size was 851 people.

3) The research of the South Russian branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences "The Level of Public Activity of the Youth of the Rostov region" (2012). The representative sample size was 1050 people.

The basis of the empirical part of this article was made by the materials of our own studies:

1) The research of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University "The Assessment by the Population of the Policy in the Sphere of Interethnic Relations" (2016). The representative sample size was 2360 people.

2) The series of expert interviews "Protest Activity of the Youth of the Rostov Region: Forming Factors and Specifics of Manifestation in the Conditions of the Cosmopolitan Region" (2013).

The materials of federal and regional media, in which concrete cases of manifestation of interethnic aggression and extremism in the Rostov Region were described, were also used in the research.

4. Results

4.1 Social and economic determinants of interethnic aggression and extremism in the Rostov Region

The Rostov Region is an industrial and agrarian South Russian region with an average extent of economic development. According to the data of official statistics, the average per capita income of the region's population grew steadily within the last five years and as of 2016 amounted to 27,695 RUB, which was the highest rate across the Southern Federal District (Territorial Body of the Federal State Statistics Service in the Rostov Region).

However, the results of special social studies allow stating the existence of the trend towards the strengthening of social inequality in the region. So, according to the data obtained by the research staff of the South Russian Branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 37% of inhabitants of the region noted that their financial position is below the average. Moreover, only 62% of the respondents specified that among their friends and acquaintances there are poor families. 42% of the region's residents spend from a quarter to a half of the monthly income for food purchase. In this situation, 24% of the region's residents work in several places, 22% regularly look for side jobs, 20% take additional loads at the primary place of employment (Volkov, 2014).

A high level of instability in the sphere of labor employment aggravates the described trends, which does not allow building a long-term strategy of increasing the material welfare for wide national groups. According to official statistics, the situation in the regional labor market is rather favorable: from 2000 to 2015, the level of the registered unemployment gradually decreased (from 15% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2015, Federal State Statistics Service). This indicator slightly exceeds the level of unemployment in the country in general, but is the lowest in the Southern Federal District. At the same time, the ratio of potential employment spheres says that the most prestigious social and professional positions in the region are rather closed: according to the online data resource on job search Head Hunter, open vacancies connected with the recruitment of administrative personnel, of bank and financial officers, employees of the information technologies sphere appear seldom (Labor Market of the Rostov Region, 2015). The situation is aggravated by the high instability in the labor market which is testified by the moods of the region's inhabitants concerning job loss risk: according to the data of the Southern Russian Branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 46% of the respondents consider quite possible the probability to become unemployed in the next 2-3 years (Volkov *et al.*, 2015).

Thus, modern social and economic situation in the region is characterized by such trends as the strengthening of social inequality along with closing of prestigious segments of labor market for the most part of the population. At this juncture, the competition for prestigious and profitable jobs is perceived sharply and painfully. Against this background, the differentiation on ethnic grounds acting as one of the peculiar features of the regional labor market and consisting in activating of ethnic business of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian ethnic groups becomes a serious factor of interethnic aggression formation: according to the results of the research of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University, 30.6% of the region's residents consider the deficiency of jobs as one of the main reasons of interethnic relations' aggravation. The noticeable places in the ranging of interethnic conflicts' sources in the region are also taken by such positions as striving of this or that ethnic group to dominate in any sphere of employment, the competition for jobs and land (Table 1).

Table 1. *Economic factors of ethnic tension in the assessments of the Rostov Region's inhabitants*

1. _____ ompetition for work positions	13.7%
2. _____ omination of ethnic group in certain sector of employment	13.8%
3. _____ ompetition (rivalry) for land among the representatives of various ethnic groups	11.8%

As Laisha (2012) notes, the representatives of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian diasporas showing ability to trade and using ethnicity as an organizational resource

of entrepreneurial activity, try to acquire a fortune in business, strengthening their social positions and causing discontent from indigenous population. As financial opportunities allow the diasporas to train their representatives at law and economic colleges, to employ them in public authorities, law-enforcement structures, indigenous population and youth, have a feeling of overlapping of social mobility channels by the Caucasian and Transcaucasian diasporas.

One of the most serious social consequences of this situation is the progressing social marginalization which is followed by the expansion of the frustration states which at confluence of certain circumstances can be transformed into protest mindsets, especially among young people. So, according to the results of survey conducted by the Southern Russian Branch of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, among the reasons, for which the youth can mainstream the protest potential, the leading positions are occupied by the low level of material security (44.9%) and the lack of conditions for professional growth (40.6%). Regarding the complicated nature of the interethnic relations in the sphere of employment, it is easy to predict that possible protest actions can have the character of interethnic clashes.

4.2 Sociocultural factors of interethnic aggression and extremism in the region

Sociocultural factors also play a significant role in determination of interethnic aggression and extremist practices in the explored region. The multiethnic population structure of the Rostov Region assumes a combination of various ethnic cultures and valuable systems in its territory, often absolutely unlike. The results of the research of Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University show that in the assessments by the region's residents, it is the differences in mental programs and behavioral strategy that are the main sources of ethnic tension and aggression (Table 2).

Table 2. *Ethnocultural diversity as a factor of ethnic tension in the assessments of the Rostov Region's inhabitants*

1. _____ Compatible norms and behavioral rules of the representatives of various ethnic groups	49.8%
2. _____ Aggressive forms of household everyday behavior of youth	41.2%
3. _____ Aggression in intergroup relations	26.5%

The researchers note that during the Soviet period the attempt of unification of education system and upbringing providing some unity of diverse national groups in ethnocultural relation within the Soviet identity was made. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and refusal of the dominating ideology caused the identity crisis which led to the revival of ethnic identity and autonomation of ethnic cultures

(Gontsovskiy, 2014). This process is most active in national regions, including in the North Caucasus, where the Soviet identity was substantially weaker in comparison with Russia and the Russianized regions.

Getting to communities with domination of the Russian population, the representatives of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian ethnic groups build behavior models, not always compatible with the behavioral rules accepted in local community. So, for example, some representatives of the republics of the North Caucasus are prone to display behavior, by which they form negative attitude from the locals who show discontent with neglect of traditional rules and foundations of the region's culture. Similar cases inevitably involve the increase in the probability of conflicts maturing.

In return, weighed estimates of small nationalities based on the stereotypes dominating in mass consciousness about "Another" can be not always characteristic of the representatives of indigenous population. These estimates and behavior models built on them can be perceived by the latter as offensive, containing elements of Nazism and racism. It also provokes various forms of manifestation of interethnic aggression, which is positioned as protection of honor, dignity, and national pride against chauvinistic attacks from the ethnic majority. Negative models of perception of interethnic distinctions against the background of violence legitimation by means of low-standard mass culture become prerequisites of interethnic aggression escalation and surge in various manifestations of extremist practices. For example, the great public response was received by sanguinary killing of Meskhetian Turk by skinheads in May 2012 in Rostov-on-Don. The crime's participants were convicted for murder on national hatred grounds.


Thus, ethnocultural distinctions act as a powerful source of tension accumulation in the Rostov Region: in crisis of contradiction between ethnic value systems, stereotypic models of perception and lack of international communication culture can provoke manifestations of interethnic aggression and crimes of extremist character.

4.3 Conflictogenic potential of labor migration as a factor of interethnic aggression growth and extremization of the Rostov Region's population

Strengthening of labor migration is one of the trends of Russia's modern development. It has a few positive effects for the receiving environment, connected first of all with partial compensation of manpower deficiency. At the same time, the expansion of migration flows in the conditions of the lack of effective models of social adaptation acts as one of the leading factors of the growth of the migrant-phobia level and interethnic aggression that in the extreme forms is expressed in commission of crimes on interethnic animosity grounds. This problem is particularly acute for multiethnic regions of the country including the Rostov Region. Annually, the region's ethnic structure is increased at the expense of the extending migration

flows: according to the Rostov Service of Statistics' data (Territorial Body of the Federal State Statistics Service in the Rostov Region, n.d.), in recent years the balance of migration remained positive, and the number of the arriving migrants grew steadily (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Dynamics of the change in the number of arriving migrants in the Rostov Region



The greatest inflow of the migrants to the explored region is noted from the republics of the North Caucasus, and the CIS countries (Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus) and Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). During the period from 2000 to 2016, "new diasporas" were formed and became stronger (Meskhetian Turks, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chinese, etc.) in the region.

What caused the appeal of the Rostov Region to labor migrants? The region is a subject with the transitive geographical location (allowing Rostov-on-Don to be called the gates of Russia South). The region is characterized by extensive territory combining areas with different climatic conditions that allow various types of agricultural activity. The social and economic and political situation in the region for the last decade remains rather stable that also promotes migration strengthening.

The estimates of the influence of migration influence on the character of interethnic relations in the region in mass consciousness of the region's residents are rather polarized: according to the research results of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University, the differentiation of respondents into two stable groups was found, one of which considered that migration did not exert any impact on interethnic relations, another, on the contrary, noted its negative influence. It is also necessary to pay attention that 13.5% of the respondents found it difficult to give a single-value estimate; these residents of the region can be taken to risk group as in the case of situation aggravation these respondents can join the group of negatively predisposed (Table 3). The obtained data allow to say that labor migration in the region bears a certain conflictogenic potential. At the same time, first the places of migrants' concentrated resettlement become hotspots of tension.

Table 3. *Distribution of the responses to the question: "What influence on interethnic relations do the migrants exert?"*

1.	Positive	9.1
2.	Negative	46.6
3.	Don't exert influence	30.8
4.	Not sure	13.5

Those are the territories in the southeast of the region, namely in the Oryol, Zavetinsky, Zimovnikovskiy, Dubovskiy, and Remontnenskiy Districts, where internal migrants from Chechnya and Dagestan settled. The landscape climatic conditions of these districts give ample opportunities for the economic activity traditional for inhabitants of these republics. At the same time, as the experts note, migration parameters which could be without serious consequences absorbed by the accepting environment from the point of view of integration of the arriving population into local communities are exceeded. The competitive fight for economic, labor and land resources in the situation of the general reduction of employment in rural districts leads to the accumulation of discontent among local population. A high level of group unity of migrants, their isolation and standards of behavior increase animosity in the receiving community. As a result, the migrant-phobia level increases considerably – the perception of labor migrants as potential carriers of social risks, and practically any household conflicts take interethnic character.

So, during the last decade in several southeast districts of the region the cases of interethnic aggression manifestation were recorded: in 2006 in Salsk there was a fight between the Dagestan and Russian youth; in 2010 – the conflict between the representatives of Russian and Chechen ethnic groups in Zimovniki; in 2012 – a mass fight between Russians and Dagestanis in the village Remontnoye; in 2015 – the conflict between Russian representatives of the Chechen community in Dubovskiy District. Among the reasons for which situations of household interaction of visitors and local population even more often develop into physical collisions, the researchers call the lack of officials' reaction to obvious violations from migrants. Such position of local authorities will mobilize the potential of protest activity of local population: according to the results of research by the Southern Russian Branch of the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences, 35% of the region's inhabitants consider interethnic conflicts to be the reason of possible mass actions in the settlement, and in Rostov-on-Don this indicator reaches 50% (Serikov, 2013b).

The additional source of tension is a steady stereotype at local population that the social security system of migrants puts them in a privileged position as the local population has no privileges. It leads to strengthening of the ethnic identity role among Russian population based on opposition of itself not to external, but internal "another" – the representative of another ethnos and (or) culture living near. Thus, labor migration bears the potential of extremization of the Rostov Region's population. The competition for tight resources and jobs, perception stereotypes and

rejection of migrants' behavior models in the receiving environment provoke the growth of migrant-phobia. The aggression level increases in this situation: household conflicts are often transformed into interethnic ones that in their extreme manifestations lead to commission of crimes of extremist character.

4.4 Influence of geopolitical situation on formation of extremist moods in the region: Ukrainian crisis and strengthening of the Islamic State

In the context of the events in Syria, Ukraine and some other countries, the problems connected with the threat of population's radicalization became sharply aggravated. In the circumstances concerned, the Rostov Region became one of the hotspots of increased risk: the common border with the South-East of Ukraine and the status of "the gates of the Caucasus" through which there is an active recruitment in the ISIS became the factors of growth of interethnic aggression level and number of crimes of extremist orientation in the region.

Speaking about the military-political crisis in Ukraine as a factor of distribution of interethnic aggression, it should be noted first that the situation aggravation changed the type of migration flows to the Rostov Region: if before the migration had mainly labor character, then since 2014 displaced persons began to prevail in the general stream. According to the data of the Federal Migration Service Office of Russia, by August 2014 the number of the displaced persons from Ukraine in the territory of the Rostov Region amounted to 53 thousand. In 2015, 85% of the total number of foreign citizens who entered the region were the citizens of Ukraine (Lutsik, 2016). For rendering social support to refugees by the Government of the Russian Federation, the state program "Rendering Assistance to Voluntary Resettlement to the Rostov Region of Compatriots Living Abroad, for 2014-2020", providing measures for assistance in supporting them with jobs and accommodation, was developed. The measures of support were also rendered by migration services, charity foundations and local population.

The local population met the first wave of displaced persons' flow from Ukraine rather tolerantly: the commonality of language smoothed a barrier in daily communication and facilitated social adaptation, and the difficult life situation of Ukrainian refugees was perceived by the region's residents with sympathy. However, in the process of the increase in migrants' number the relations, between them and the receiving population became aggravated. The main factor, according to the experts, was social and economic, that is, the increase in the competition for jobs (this problem became especially urgent in rural areas) and the increase in the load on the region's social infrastructure. The increase in the irritation of the receiving region's representatives was promoted also by dependency attitude to the support package of measures of some able-bodied migrants. As a result, if at first the refugees caused pity and sympathy, then soon between them and the residents of districts where they arrived, there was misunderstanding, and in many cases the attitude towards them worsened. Because of it, many refugees began to withdraw

into their community, being estranged from the representatives of local population. Quite often, similar communities became the platform of antisocial behavior that caused negative reaction of indigenous population (Sivashenkova, 2015).

The growth of migrant-phobia and aggression during the most active inflow of the refugees caused a wave of information extremism cases: in social networks and forums, the messages began to appear which contained calls to evict the migrants back to the territory of the South-East of Ukraine. The active audience of radical information platforms widely relayed these moods. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the listed circumstances did not lead to cases of open collisions between the displaced persons and the region's residents.

Speaking about the geopolitical factors of the extremization of the Rostov Region's population, it is impossible to ignore the problem of the growing influence of radical Islam. According to the data obtained by the research group of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University, every fourth inhabitant of the region calls radical Islam the main reason for interethnic tension formation, and this indicator exceeds similar figures even in those subjects where Islam as religion is more widespread.

For recruitment of the region's inhabitants in ISIS ranks, the extremists conduct a large-scale promotional campaign on the Internet. For creating an attractive image of the extremist organizations, social networks are actively used. The main object of this influence is the youth characterized by maximalism and the lack of life experience. For example, in April 2017 the criminal case was initiated against a 25-year-old female resident of the Matveyevo-Kurgansky District who ran away to Syria; in January 2016 in Rostov-on-Don, three girls, the most senior of whom was 25-year-old, were detained on suspicion of preparation of terrorist attack organization in the shopping center of the city. However, it should be noted that similar cases are not mass today.

The foregoing allows to refer the geopolitical situation aggravation, connected with the crisis in Ukraine and strengthening of the Islamic State, to the factors of the population extremization and growth of interethnic aggression in the Rostov Region. And though the described tendencies did not gain critical character yet, it is possible to speak about the conflictogenic environment, the creation of which at crisis emergency situations can be subject of provocations.

5. Discussion

Thus, the economic crisis, the difficult geopolitical situation, and poorly controlled migration in the conditions of the multiethnic region create tension in interethnic relations: in the conditions, when considerable sectors of society were isolated from positive scenarios of social adaptation, there is an expansion of frustration states, which find their manifestation in aggression accumulation and distribution of

extremist practices. The urgent need for the minimization of these trends demands defining of a complex of administrative and organizational conditions of counteraction. Now, the expansion prospects of extremist activity types and tightening of punishment for incitement of ethnic hatred and manifestation of interethnic aggression are widely discussed in the criminal law system; the list of the organizations, the activity of which is regarded as extremist, constantly extends. The focus of attention of specialists in national security is also the problem of improving information technologies of the population's extremization counteraction. From year to year, the system of carrying out situation monitoring in the regions became more and more perfect.

At the same time, most regional experts in the field of international relations agree in opinion that the complex of legal and preventive measures is not enough. The key problems in this case are the lack of a system policy of the interethnic relations regulation, and the imperfection of the adaptation system of migrant workers and displaced persons. At present, the institute of diasporas has high potential in this relation in the Rostov Region: against the background of the low level of social trust in law enforcement agencies, they become one of the few effective tools of settling ethno-national contradictions.

Special attention should be paid to improving the system of tolerance formation and preventing extremism among young people. In this regard, the development of the multicultural education system in the region, based on the ideas of training of the younger generation for life in the conditions of multinational and multicultural environment, must play the main role.

6. Conclusion

The results of the research allow drawing a conclusion that today the regional environment represents a range of risks of interethnic aggression escalation and crimes of extremist character. The differences in the mental programs and the economic competition in the local labor market provoke interethnic tension formation, and the ethnic component can be added to any kind of conflict. These tendencies have not gained critical character yet; however, under the influence of the emphasized factors, the conflictogenic environment is formed, which in case of crisis situations or appearance of radical opinion leaders can provoke the growth of extremist crimes. Thus, it becomes obvious that the effective system of counteraction to these phenomena must be based on taking into account the entire range of the listed factors. In conclusion, it is necessary to pay special attention to the importance of close interaction of all government and public institutions, political parties, and media in the system work on the prevention of crimes and elimination of other threats to the security of person, society and state reproduced by extremism.

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